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The Struggle Of Blacks For Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity: An Overview
By GLYNDA LEANETTE FLENTROY*
Introduction
Parents, educators, social scientists, legislatures, and the courts have
long been concerned with ascertaining what factors will ensure equal educa-
tional opportunity for all students. Early studies postulated that educational
quality was variously dependent on per pupil expenditures, institutional
facilities, curriculum, and teachers. More recent studies, however, have
focused on the freedom to attend the school of one's choice and the
equitable distribution of society's resources, and have concluded that these
factors may be the most significant which contribute to the attainment of
equal educational opportunity.
Accessibility to the school of one's choice provides the individual with
psychological and physical mobility within the academic milieu, removes
the implications of a caste system within American society, and liberates the
individual's mind for further intellectual exploration.1 A more equitable
distribution of society's resources makes it possible for each individual to
maximize his or her innate capabilities.
2
It is significant that Blacks seeking educational advantages traditionally
have been deprived of both the freedom to attend the school of their choice
and the opportunity to share equally in society's resources. 3 During the
* Member, third year class.
I. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494 (1954). See also E. FRAZIER,
THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES (1957); K. CLARK, PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD (1955); H.
WITMER & R. KoTINSKY, PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING (1952); Deutscher & Chein, The
Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J.
PYSCH. 259 (1948).
2. Cohen. .Defininz Eaual Educational Opportunity, 61 GEo. L.J. 847, 847-49 (1973). See
also Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). "One is poor not because he has no
money, but because, possibly owing to lack of money, he lacks also access to the social
instrumentalities that make humanly significant action possible. In part, it is a simple matter of
not having the price of admission." Id. (quoting Haworth, Deprivation and the Good City, in
POWER, POVERTY, AND URBAN POLICY at 27, 39 (W. Bloomberg & H. Schmandt eds. 1968)).
3. In the United States in 1865 there were 5 million Africans, 95% of whom were
illiterate. A. BALLARD, THE EDUCATION OF BLACK FOLK 9 (1973). As late as 1963, Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy pronounced that over -2,000 school districts in the South still
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American era of slavery it was a criminal offense in the southern'region of
the United States to teach Blacks to read and write. 4 Blacks were at that time
regarded, by southern slave masters and northern abolitionists alike, as
intellectually inferior to Whites. 5 After emancipation, the opposition to
education for Blacks endured. White southerners feared circumvention of
the system of serfdom they planned td impose on Blacks, while northerners
had only a missionary interest in the ex-slaves. The attitude toward Black
literacy was characterized by the phrase, "[a]n educated Black would be a
dissatisfied Black."
6
Blacks continued their efforts to receive an adequate education in the
South, and with the assistance of White missionaries and philanthropic
entities, a network of primary and higher educational institutions arose.
7
The source of funding, the faculties, and administrators, however, remained
White. 8 Between 1865 and 1935 Black faculty and administrators sought to
replace the White professors and presidents.9 Although Blacks were largely
successful in these efforts, the educational policies remained under the
direction of Whites. 10 It was difficult for Blacks to receive the most minimal
education, and when acquired it was laced with discriminatory sentiments. 
11
Those racially discriminatory attitudes regarding Blacks and education con-
stitute the foundation upon which the nation's segregated school system has
been based.
This note presents an overview of judicial treatment of separate schools
for Blacks. It focuses on the emergence and shaping of desegregation plans,
desegregation and its effect on the learning process, and the social and
educational ramifications of desegregation. The effect that court decisions
[operate) totally segregated school systems." Fleming, Brown and the Three R's: Race, Resi-
dence, and Resegregation, in FROM BROWN TO BRADLEY 8, 11 (R. Browning ed. 1975).
4. L. BENNETT, BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF THE NEGRO IN AMERICA (1619-
1964) 70 (reprinted 1968).
5. An abolitionist once remarked: "'[We may concede it as a matter of fact that [the
Negro race) is inferior; but does it follow therefore that it is right to enslave a man simply
because he is inferior? This, to me, is a most abhorrent doctrine . . . (as) it would place those
who are deficient in intellect at the mercy of those gifted in mental endowment.' "A. BALLARD,
THE EDUCATION OF BLACK FOLK 10- 11 (1973).
6. Id. at 12.
7. Id. at 13.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 13-14.
10. Id. One of the White missionaries responsible for the creation of Black industrial
training colleges, General S.C. Armstrong, expressed the sentiments that the African "is
capable of acquiring knowledge to any degree and, to a certain age, at least, with about the same
facility as white children; but lacks the power to assimilate and digest it. . . .He is a child of
the tropics, and the differential of race goes deeper than the skin." Id. at 13 (quoting H.
BULLOCK, A HISTORY OF NEGRO EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH 76 (1967)). As Ballard states,
Armstrong "regarded Blacks as childlike, lazy, slothful, and in need of the most rigid and
civilizing discipline. Most of those who funded Black education in the South shared this




have had on Blacks and their communities is analyzed with regard to
disproportionate busing, closing of Black schools, ability tracking in deseg-
regated schools, suspensions and expulsions in desegregated schools, and
displacement of Black principals and teachers. Finally, the note appraises
new, more logical, and equitable directions for the education of Blacks,
emphasizing alternative schools and the restructuring of school finance
plans.
I. Judicial History of School Desegregation
A. From Roberts (1850) to Brown I (1954)
One of the earliest school segregation controversies the courts were
called upon to decide was Roberts v. City of Boston,12 a case that involved a
Black child's request to attend one of the several White schools close to her
home. Boston was divided into twenty-one school districts, two of which
were specifically designated for Black children of primary school age. One
of the regulations governing the Boston school board's operations contained
a provision that each applicant of suitable age and qualifications be admitted
to the school nearest his or her residence. The plaintiff, accordingly, applied
to the school nearest her home. She was refused admission, and her father
brought suit under a state statute that permitted any child unlawfully ex-
cluded from the public schools to recover damages from the city that
supported those schools. 3
The Massachusetts Supreme Court focused on whether the child had in
fact been "excluded." Since there were two Black schools available to her
within the district, the court determined that she had not been excluded
within the meaning of the statute even though it meant traveling past five
White primary schools to reach the Black schools and even though the
board's denial of admission was in violation of Boston's school admission
regulations. The court explained that the board had the authority to classify
and distribute pupils whenever it was in the best interests of those pupils and
the welfare of society.14 Hence, in the absence of an abuse of discretion, the
board's decisions were conclusive and separate schools for Black children
did not violate their constitutional rights.
The separation of the races, both in education and other areas of life,
continued to exist and was in fact given legal authorization by the United
States Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson.15 A Louisiana statute 16 pro-
vided that railway companies that furnished passenger transportation must
supply separate but equal accommodations for Blacks and Whites. Plessy
maintained that separate but equal accommodations were unconstitutional
12. 59 Mass. 198 (1849).
13. Id. at 199.
14. Id. at 208.
15. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
16. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:528 (West 1950) (repealed 1972).
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because: the railroad company was a common carrier incorporated under the
laws of Louisiana, Louisiana was not authorized to distinguish between
citizens according to their race, and the statute was in conflict with the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
The Court held that if forced separation of the races "stamps the
colored race with a badge of inferiority . . . it is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it." 17 The Court, ignoring the congressional intent behind
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, concluded by saying that if
both races have equal civil and political rights, the inferiority of one to the
other is an impossibility; if one race is socially inferior, the Constitution
cannot place them in parity.18
The constitutionality of the separate but equal doctrine was not chal-
lenged in Cumming v. Board of Education.19 Instead, Blacks sought the
closing of a high school for Whites because Blacks were being taxed but no
high school was provided for their children. 20 The Court held that the
plaintiffs' requested relief was improper. If the plaintiffs had sought organi-
zation of a Black high school and the board's refusal was alleged to be an
abuse of discretion, a different issue would have been presented. The Court
found, however, that closing of the White high school could confer no
benefits upon the plaintiffs. Furthermore, public education via state taxation
was a concern of the individual state, and federal interference with the
management of those schools could only be justified when there was a clear
and unmistakable disregard of constitutional rights.
21
The Court had begun to deviate from its previous posture when in 1938
it ordered a Black woman admitted to the law school of a White Missouri
university.22 State law dictated that if a Black wished to study law he would
have to seek his legal education outside the state and tuition would be paid
by the state of Missouri.23 The Supreme Court, rejecting this arrangement,
held that it was "a denial of the equality of legal right to the enjoyment of
the privilege which the State has set up, and the provision for the payment of
tuition fees in another State does not remove the discrimination.' '24
17. 163 U.S. at 551.
18. Id. at 551-52.
19. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
20. The board of education closed the Black high school attended by 60 students in order
to provide funds for three primary schools necessary to educate 300 Black children of primary
school age. Id. at 532.
21. Id. at 545.
22. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
23. Id. at 342-44.
24. Id. at 349-50. Ten years later, again faced with an appeal by a Black to compel her
admission to a White law school, the Court granted her request for a writ of mandamus, thus
affirming her right to the legal education offered by the state. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332
U.S. 631 (1948).
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A still more unusual set of circumstances was presented to the Court by
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents.' McLaurin was admitted to the
graduate school of the University of Oklahoma as a doctoral candidate. In
keeping with the state's policy to offer separate education for Blacks and
Whites, McLaurin was forced to sit in a row of the classroom specifically
designated for Blacks; he also was allowed to sit only at similarly assigned
tables in the library and the cafeteria. The Court said that the restrictions
placed upon McLaurin "impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to
learn his profession. 26 Thus McLaurin was being denied his right to equal
protection of the laws, and had to receive the same treatment the state
accorded to students of other races.
27
The Supreme Court further eroded the concept of separate but equal
facilities in Sweatt v. Painter,28 which held that a Texas law school desig-
nated for Blacks was inferior to the one designated for Whites in size of
faculty, scope of the library, and variety of course offerings. 29 The Court
stated:
The law school to which Texas is willing to admit petitioner ex-
cludes from its student body members of the racial group which
number eighty-five percent of the population of the State and
includes most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other
officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be dealing when he
becomes a member of the Texas bar.
30
Accordingly, with such a significant portion of the state's legal community
unrepresented in the Black school's population, Sweatt could not be accord-
ed an education equal to the one offered at the University of Texas Law
School.
31
In Brown v. Board of Education,32 marking the official demise of the
"separate but equal doctrine," the Supreme Court held that segregated
public schools were unconstitutional and ordered that the maintenance of
dual school systems be ended. The Court refused to look only at the tangible
characteristics of the educational institutions involved, and instead realized
the necessity of scrutinizing the effect of forced separation of the races on
public education. 33 Relying heavily upon the evidence tendered by social
scientists, 34 the Court concluded that separate schools were "inherently
25. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
26. Id. at 641.
27. Id. at 642.
28. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
29. Id. at 633-34.
30. Id. at 634.
31. Id.
32. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. Id. at 492.
34. Id. at 494 n. 11.
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unequal," ,35 and that the psychological implications of this practice had far-
reaching and damaging consequences:
To separate [Black phildren] from others of similar age and qualifi-
cations solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiori-
ty as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.
36
The substantive issues were decided by the Court in the first Brown
decision (Brown 1); the Court two years later in Brown v. Board 9f
Education (Brown I') 3 7 placed the primary responsibility for devising plans
to meet the desegregation decree on the school authorities themselves. The
lower courts were then to analyze the efforts of those authorities to assure
good faith compliance with the Brown I order.
3 8
B. From Brown I to the Present
After Brown II, the Supreme Court examined a myriad of novel issues
ranging from delaying tactics by school authorities to the viability of inter-
district remedies. In Cooper v. Aaron3 9 the petitioners asked the Court to
suspend a desegregation plan in Little Rock, Arkansas, for two and one-half
years in light of the chaos and mob violence that resulted in the disruption of
the educational process. In rejecting the appeal the Court recognized that the
constitutional rights of the Black children were not to be sacrificed in an
effort to preserve law and order; the desegregation plan would not be
suspended."3
In 1963 the Court denied certiorari in Board of School Commissioners
v. Davis,41 thus permitting the lower court decision to stand. The lower
court directed the board to cease segregation and submit a plan for its
elimination without undue delay in view of the fact that nine years had
elapsed since Brown I and yet the school board had not initiated any steps
toward compliance.42 In 1968 the Court made a dramatic change in its
perusal of acceptable plans for the transition to unitary school systems. The
school board in Green v. County School Board43 devised a freedom-of-
35. Id. at 495.
36. Id. at 494.
37. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
38. Id. at 299. State legislative and judicial footdragging was unfortunately permitted
under the Brown II language of "all deliberate speed" as the time standard for enforcing the
Court's desegregation order. Id. at 301.
39. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
40. Id. at 16. The Court further observed that the violent situation had been exacerbated
by the disruptive and'evasive tactics of the governor and other state officials, in stating that the
petitioner school board members stood "in this litigation as agents of the state" though they
might be personally blameless. Id.
41. 375 U.S. 894 (1963).
42. 322 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894 (1963). See also Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Hart v.
Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
43. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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choice plan that permitted each student personally to select the school she
would attend. During the three-year period the plan was in effect, no White
students had chosen to attend the all-Black school, and only fifteen percent
of the Black students had enrolled in the all-White school. The Court held
that the efficiency of freedom-of-choice plans would be measured by how
well they implemented the edict in Brown I, and where more expeditious
methods for abolishing segregated school systems were available, such as
zoning, freedom-of-choice plans would be unacceptable. The Court further
stated that any plan which at such a late date "fails to provide meaningful
assurance of prompt and effective disestablishment of a dual system" was
intolerable.
44
Examination of school desegregation plans created the need for specific
boundaries within which federal courts could fashion remedies. In Swann v.
Board of Education45 the Court discussed several factors that lower courts
and school boards might look to in evaluating desegregation plans. The
Court held that: (1) the limited use of racial quotas was permissible because
cognizance of the racial composition in an entire school system was a useful
point of departure in forming a remedy to deal with past racial segregation in
schools;4 6 (2) one-race schools were not per se an indication that the school
system still practiced segregation, but the school authorities would have the
burden of convincing the court that the school's racial composition was not
the product of past or present discriminatory actions; 47 (3) the pairing and
grouping of noncontiguous attendance zones was an acceptable student
assignment tool; 48 and (4) busing was a remedial technique within the
court's power whenever a dual system could not be dismantled by allowing
children to attend schools close to their homes.
49
In 1974, however, the Court began to retreat from its unrestrained use
of equitable relief in desegregation challenges. In Milliken v. Bradley5" the
44. Id. at 438. The Court was greatly influenced by the views of the 1966 United States
Commission on Civil Rights regarding why freedom-of-choice plans had proved to be non-
productive in southern states. The commission found freedom-of-choice to require affirmative
action by both Black and White parents and pupils. No affirmative action had been exercised
primarily because: (I) Blacks had a fear of retaliation from hostile Whites in the classroom, as
well as in the community; (2) poverty deterred many Black families from sending their children
to all-White schools. Parents did not want their children to attend all-White schools without
suitable clothing; and (3) improvements in facilities and equipment in all-Black schools had a
tendency to discourage Blacks from selecting White schools. Id. at 440-41 n.5. See also Raney
v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); and
Georgia v. Mitchell, 450 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1971), for the proposition that school boards have
an "affirmative duty" to eliminate racial discrimination in public schools and, where the
schools remain one-race institutions, free transfer plans do not meet that duty.
45. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
46. Id. at 25.
47. Id. at 26.
48. Id. at 28.
49. Id. at 30. See also Drummond v. Acres, 409 U.S. 1228 (1972); Singleton v. Jackson
Separate School Dist., 509 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1975).
50. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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Court identified the extent to which busing would be permitted in order to
achieve racial integration in the public schools. The district court found that
the Detroit board of education had perpetuated racial separation in the local
schools, and concluded that remedial measures limited in scope to the
Detroit school district alone could not achieve a unitary system. The district
court therefore ordered the board to submit a desegregation plan that would
encompass a three-county area of eighty-five autonomous school districts.
The submission of the desegregation plan was ordered despite the absence of
any allegations or evidence that those separate districts had ever been guilty
of intentional school segregation. 51 In abrogating the remedy, the Supreme
Court emphasized that before the boundaries of autonomous school districts
may be set aside for the purpose of effecting a cross-district remedy, there
must appear to have been a constitutional violation in one school district that
created substantial segregation in another district.
52
Although racial separation in public education had been found to
constitute innately unequal treatment under the laws of the United States,
and although the nation's school authorities had been forced to move toward
eradication of the traditional dual school system, Blacks had yet to experi-
ence the social and educational implications of Brown I and its progeny. No
one could have foreseen the morass of exacting circumstances in which
Blacks have found themselves in the continuing pursuit of equal educational
opportunity.
I. Social and Educational Results Since Brown I
A. Purported Benefits of School Desegregation
Chief Justice Warren, delivering the opinion of the Court in Brown I,
emphasized the stigma of inferiority that attaches to Black children who are
forced to attend schools separate from their White counterparts solely
because of their race. 53 The Court added that feelings of inferiority affect a
child's motivation to learn, and consequently, " 'retard the educational and
mental development of negro children.' "5 Since the conclusion of the
social scientists (in which the Supreme Court concurred) was that forced
51. 402 U.S. at 729-30. For the district court opinion ordering this broad desegregation
plan see Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971). Similar to many school
desegregation cases, Bradley v. Milliken has an extensive judicial histery: 338 F. Supp. 582
(E.D. Mich. 1971), appeal denied, 468 F.2d 902 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 844 (1972),
aff'd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 418 U.S. 717 (1973). The case continued, 402 F.
Supp. 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd as modified, 509 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1975). A desegregation
plan was ordered implemented, 411 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Mich. 1975), modified, 540 F.2d 229 (6th
Cir.), aff'd, 97 S. Ct. 2749 (1977).
52. 418 U.S. at 744-45. Compare United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 541 F.2d
1211 (7th Cir. 1976) (inter-district remedy upheld) with Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 1211
(6th Cir. 1976) (where the inter-district remedy not allowed).
53. 347 U.S. at 494.
54. Id.
[Vol. 4
Summer 1977] EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 613
segregation was psychologically detrimental, 55 it seemed obvious that the
most effective and equitable remedy would be the abolition of separate
schools for Black and White children. 56 It is from the holding in Brown I
that the alleged benefits of desegregation arose.
It has been noted that social scientists in the 1950's postulated that
desegregation would provide Black children with
a greater sense of personal dignity; a rise in personal ambition; a
greater confidence and respect for their own sub-group ....
Negro youths are likely to attain higher standards of academic
proficiency and exert their capacities more fully after desegrega-
tion, because of increased morale, decreased self-hatred, and a
fuller sense of sharing the American Dream.
57
Social scientists also believed that desegregation would increase the educa-
tional achievement of Black children merely because White schools had
greater educational resources. 58 Still another basis for integrating schools
was the "contact theory" advanced by social scientist Gordon Allport in
1954, which premised that greater contact between the races would result in
mutual understanding and tolerance of cultural differences.
59
Hence, there have been four distinct factors motivating school integra-
tion: (1) the removal of the Black inferiority stigma in order to heighten self-
esteem, (2) access by Black pupils to superior resources at White institu-
tions, (3) increasing the academic achievement of Black students, and (4)
lessening racial prejudice. Among the factors motivating school integration,
the scholastic performance of Black students in an integrated academic
environment has received the most attention from social scientists.
B. Educational Impact on Blacks
Since Brown I numerous studies have been undertaken in an attempt to
measure the performance of integrated Black students in comparison to
Whites, as well as to other Black students who had not entered the integrated
school setting. One survey of the research discovered four disparate conclu-
sions from the studies thus far conducted: (1) racial integration results in an
increase in the school performance of minority youth, (2) racial integration
has a mixed effect on minority students, (3) racial integration has no effect
on the academic achievement of minority students, and (4) racial integration
has negative effects on the scholastic achievement of minority students.
60
55. Id. at 495 n.l !.
56. Id. at 495.
57. ST. JOHN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN 43 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as ST. JOHN].
58. Lines, Race and Learning: A Perspective on the Research, 11 INEQUALITY IN EDUC. 26
(1972).
59. Armor, The Evidence on Busing, in THE GREAT SCHOOL Bus CONTROVERSY 84-85 (N.
Mills ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as SCHOOL Bus CONTROVERSY].
60. Weinberg, The Relationship Between School Desegregation and Academic Achieve-
ment: A Review of the Research, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 241, 243 (1975).
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The only consensus among the social scientists whose studies were reviewed
was that there is very little indication that desegregation might lower the rate
of achievement for minority students; there also appears to be no evidence
that desegregation lowers the achievement level of Whites. 61 Additional
surveys of similar studies on desegregation and academic achievement
report that over half of the studies conducted have found that no significant
difference in educational achievement between segregated and desegregated
Black children exists.
62
As previously noted, one factor motivating the integration of public
schools is the belief that a sense of inferiority attaches to Black children who
are forced to attend schools separate from Whites. Accordingly, studies
have been conducted with a view toward learning more about the self-
esteem and aspirations of Black children in both integrated and noninte-
grated school settings. One early study was undertaken by James S. Cole-
man pursuant to section 402 of the Civil Rights Act of 196463 for the
purpose of determining the extent that equal educational opportunity was not
available to various racial groups in the United States' public educational
institutions. The Coleman Report recognized the importance of self-concept
in school achievement and future success: "If a child's self-concept is low,
if he feels he cannot succeed, then this will affect the effort he puts into the
task and thus, his chance of success."
64
To measure self-concept, the Coleman Report asked ninth and twelfth
grade Black and White students three questions:
(1) How bright do you think you are in comparison with the other
students in your grade?
(2) Agree or disagree: I sometimes feel that I just can't learn.
(3) Agree or disagree: I would do better in schoolwork if teachers
didn't go so fast.bS
The result indicated no differences between Black and White students in
their self-perceptions; both groups held themselves in high esteem.
66
Another study examined the self-concepts of elementary school stu-
dents, focusing upon how the student viewed herself, how the student would
like to be, and how the student thought others viewed her. 67 The concluding
61. Id. at 268-69.
62. ST. JOHN, supra note 57, at 39. See also SCHOOL Bus CONTROVERSY, supra note 59, at
95. See Kiesling, The Value to Society of Integrated Education and Compensatory Education,
61 GEO. L.J. 857 (1973), for findings that there are no substantial differences between the
scholastic achievement of Black students bused to White schools and those Black students who
were not.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-i (1970).




67. Soares & Soares, Self-Perceptions of Culturally Disadvantaged Children, 6 Am. EDUC.
RES. J. 31 (1969).
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comments of the researchers were: "It is most interesting to note that, not
only did the [minority] group indicate positive self-perceptions, it also had
higher self-perceptions than the [White] group."68 A possible explanation
for this outcome was the Black children attending neighborhood schools
were isolated from the negative attitudes of American society toward their
race and therefore did not have the opportunity to incorporate those negative
sentiments while developing their self-concepts.
69
A 1968 study in the city of Baltimore of children and self-esteem
produced interesting findings regarding Black students in integrated schools
and Black students who remained in predominantly Black neighborhood
schools. 70 A sample of the questions asked the children is:
1. A kid told me: "There's a lot wrong with me." Do you ever
feel like this?
2. Another kid said: "I'm not much good at anything." Do
you ever feel like this?
3. Everybody has some things about him which are good and
some things about him which are bad. Are more of the things about
you good, bad, or are they both about the same?
4. Another kid said, "I am no good." Do you ever feel this?
5. How happy are you with the kind of person you are?
7'
The study found that Black children in predominantly White schools were
more likely to have been exposed to overt racial prejudice, were more likely
to learn that the Black race holds the lowest position in society, and scored
lower in self-esteem.72 Blacks attending Black neighborhood schools, how-
ever, did not exhibit these feelings. Due to their community isolation they
did not tend to internalize the hostility directed toward their race.
73
The data from research on desegregation and the aspirations of Black
and White students have generated conclusions similar to those regarding
self-concept. The Coleman Report74 addressed itself to the aspirations and
motivations of students and discovered that a high proportion of Blacks
wanted to be among the best pupils in class. 75 Moreover, a recent survey of
studies concerned with these issues reported:
Most studies of student occupational and educational aspira-
tions undertaken over the past twenty years have indicated that
black students have aspirations equal to or higher than those of
68. rd. at 42.
69. Id. In contrast, the White student from a middle-class environment was likely to
experience more pressure to succeed academically from parents and other adults. If the child
did not meet their expectations he often experienced a lower sense of self-esteem. Id.
70. ROSENBERG & SIMMONS, BLACK AND WHITE SELF-ESTEEM: THE URBAN SCHOOL CHILD
(1971).
71. Id. at 11-12.
72. Id. at 127.
73. Id. at 131.
74. See COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 64.
75. Id. at 278.
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white students of similar socioeconomic status. Black students are
also somewhat more likely than white students of similar socioeco-
nomic background to want to attend college.
76
Additionally, a study of a Boston voluntary busing program, in which Black
inner city students were bused to predominantly White suburban schools,
showed no significant differences in occupational aspirations between the
Black students bused and their peers remaining in the inner city schools.
77
Thus, it appears from the available research that not only do Black children
have very positive feelings about themselves, but that desegregation may
tend to negate that confidence.
HI. Broader Repercussions of School Desegregation
on the Black Community
A. Inequities Experienced by Black Children
1. The Burden of Busing
The efficacy of many desegregation plans necessitated transporting
students from one racially-identifiable school to another. But as those plans
became implemented Blacks, more often than Whites, found themselves
being transported away from their schools. Consequently, Blacks returned
to the courts to present a new issue in the desegregation controversy: Why
should Blacks bear the burden of busing? In Parris v. School Committee of
Medford,78 community parents alleged that, in order to integrate the one
racially-imbalanced grammar school in the city of Medford, the school
committee had adopted a plan compelling Black students to be bused out of
that district to grammar schools located elsewhere. The school committee's
plan did not, however, require the busing of White students into the district
containing the racially-imbalanced school, even though Whites were being
transported to various school districts throughout the city for the purpose of
eliminating overcrowded conditions. The district court refused to grant the
declaratory and injunctive relief sought, explaining that where proposals for
curing the situation had been actively discussed by the school committee and
community groups, the court would not interfere with administrative at-
tempts to solve limited racial imbalance.
79
In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Board of Education,8 0 the busing plan
at issue provided for the busing of Black and Puerto Rican students to White
76. Epps, Impact of School Desegregation on Aspirations, Self-Concepts, and Other
Aspects of Personality, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 300 (1975),
77. Id. at 301. However, there are studies that have concluded that -[b]oth the self-
concept and the aspiration of black children tend to be stronger in segregated schools .... "
ST. JOHN, supra note 57, at 59 (quoting Armor, The Evidence on Busing, 28 PUB. INTEREST 90,
101 (1972)).
78. 305 F. Supp. 356 (D. Mass. 1969).
79. Id. at 361.
80. 423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970).
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neighborhood schools without reciprocal busing of White students into the
Black and Puerto Rican neighborhood schools. The community participants
seeking relief asked that the one-way busing be ceased, and again the
request for judicial intervention was denied. The court found that the board
had acted in good faith and in a nonarbitrary manner in providing racial
balance. 81 Thus, judicial intervention was inappropriate.
A similar issue arose in Kelly v. Metropolitan County Board of Educa-
tion.82 The dispute arose over the lower court's adoption of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare's (HEW) desegregation plan. Parents
asserted that the plan should not have been selected over the one they
proposed since the HEW plan placed a disproportionate burden of desegre-
gation on Blacks. The court of appeals viewed the transportation of Black
students from grades one through four and White students from grades five
through six as not fatal to the HEW arrangement.8 3
Parental complaints in Higgins v. Board of Education84 focused on the
busing of Black students out of the central city area of Grand Rapids and
into the suburban areas, while not requiring White students from the suburbs
to be bused into the core of the city. The parents asserted that the school
board's concern that massive bilateral busing might result in "white flight"
was a manifestation of the board catering to the fears and prejudices of
Whites. The court recognized that the burdens and inconveniences of de-
segregation should not be distributed discriminatorily; the court stated,
however, that where there is no history of a school district practicing
purposeful segregation, plans to improve racial balance in its schools should
not be as restrictive as in those instances where a district has engaged in such
a practice. 85 The court added that the possibility of "white flight" from a
school district could not be used as a reason for noncompliance with an
integration order; the school board was not compelled to ignore that possi-
bility, however, when it was in the process of formulating a voluntary plan
to achieve racial balance and desired not to lose the support of the public if
lost support would thwart the plan. 86 One-way busing continued.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle
that official governmental acts that produce racially disproportionate effects
are not per se unconstitutional. Petitioners in Washington v. Davis87 alleged
that an examination administered by the Washington, D.C., police depart-
ment to persons applying for positions as police officers was discriminatory
because it excluded a much higher percentage of Black applicants than
81. Id. at 124.
82. 463 F.2d 732 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972).
83. Id. at 746.
84. 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974).
85. Id. at 793.
86. Id. at 794. See also Lee v. Chambers County Bd. of Educ., 533 F.2d 132 (5th Cir.
1976).
87. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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White applicants. The Court held that "a law or other official act, without
regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is not uncon-
stitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.'' 88 The
Court held that intentional discrimination must be shown by evidence of
systematic exclusion of racial group members.
The Court addressed the same issue in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.89 when a developer of racially
integrated housing, together with minority group prospective tenants, com-
plained that a rezoning denial was racially motivated and in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reiterated
that a discriminatory result must be preceded by discriminatory intent before
the governmental conduct can be said to violate the equal protection
clause. 9
0
2. The Closing of Black Schools
Another consequence of the implementation of desegregation plans has
been the frequent closing of Black neighborhood schools. In making the
transition from a dual school system to a unitary one, the two methods used
most often have been (1) busing Black and White students to previously
segregated schools, and (2) busing only Black students to White schools and
closing the Black schools, thus making reciprocal busing unnecessary or
impossible. 91 Many White parents prefer the second alternative because the
White student will be spared the inconvenience of having to participate in
any busing program. Moreover, the White student is relieved of confronta-
tion with what is believed to be an inferior environment, and can also avoid
contact with what is denigrated by many Whites as a "Negro institution.'"92
Thus, the courts were called upon to address the issue of the closing of
Black schools. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Mims v. Duval
County School Board93 warned that such closings are prohibited when
based upon invidious racial discrimination. 94 The court found, however,
that the school board's reasons for the closings were justified.95 The discon-
tinued schools were variously plagued by: (1) a small school site in a
declining neighborhood; (2) location near a city incinerator, a polluted
creek, and a meat and poultry company that resulted in stench and sewage at
the school; (3) location in a hard narcotics area; and (4) incidents of
vandalism and intrusion to such an extent that teachers and students locked
88. Id. at 239 (emphasis in original).
89. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
90. Id. at 563.
91. See generally Note, Inequality in Desegregation: Black School Closings, 39 U. CHt. L.
REv. 658 (1972).
92. Id.
93. 447 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d
746 (5th Cir. 1971).
94. 447 F.2d at 1331.
95. Id. at 1333.
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their classrooms for safety.96 In summary, the court reiterated that closing of
a school must be grounded upon nonracial reasons: "That is the case here
although appellants may no doubt and with justification question why these
particular schools were not selected for closing prior to the conversion to a
unitary system."
97
In Ellis v. Board of Public Instruction98 parents again requested judi-
cial intervention in the closing of Black neighborhood schools. Because the
schools were located in heavy traffic areas that had become very commer-
cialized, and due to the increased property value of the schools, the board
wanted to sell the land on which the schools were situated. The court found
that these factors amply supported the board's decision to cease operation of
the schools.
99
The concerns prompting the Black community's desire to maintain its
schools have not been addressed by the judiciary. Those concerns include:
the disproportionate burden of busing that Blacks have had to bear; the
availability of facilities for recreational, social, and civic functions that local
schools often provide; the possible loss of an administration sensitive to
community needs; and the implication of second-class citizenship-the
feeling being "that black schools are not good enough for white students
and that the cost of integration for the black community is the loss of its
schools."100 It has been suggested that the courts, whenever reviewing the
closing of Black schools, should "place a heavier burden on school boards
to justify closings; moreover, [the courts] should focus on discriminatory
effect rather than intent." 101
3. Curriculum Tracking
Once Black students are finally placed in desegregated schools, they
often find themselves segregated in special classrooms through the use of
curriculum tracking. Tracking is the method of identifying and grouping
pupils who have similar learning abilities for the purpose of providing them
with a particularized course of study. This method of labeling students is
widely used in American schools.102 Students are tested and assigned to
classes and instructors in conformity with the school's evaluation of their
96. Id. at 1332.
97. Id. at 1333. Addressing the coincidental nature of the school closings at a time when
desegregation efforts were underway, the court conjectured: "[Plerhaps their deterioration has
been recent; but in any event, it would not be remedial to require their continued operation in
the absence of a showing of racial discrimination in their closing." Id.
98. 465 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 966 (1973).
99. Id. at 880.
100. Note, Inequality in Desegregation: Black School Closings, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 658, 659
(1972).
101. Id. at 668. But see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97
S. Ct. 555 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
102. Sorgen, Testing and Tracking in Public Schools, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1129 (1973).
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progress and potential. 113 These evaluations determine not only what the
students will be taught, but also their roles and "status in life after [they
have] completed [their] schooling."''0
4
A study of eleven Missouri school districts revealed a disproportionate
number of Black children in educable mentally retarded (EMR) pro-
grams. 1 5 Most schools use intelligence tests for labeling and assigning
students to EMR classes."0 6 The two tests most widely used are the Stan-
ford-Binet Intelligence Scale and the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for chil-
dren. 107 Both tests were standardized by examining only White children.108
Additionally, any child whose father was unemployed or absent from the
home was excluded from the standardization group. Consequently, "[i]n
addition to a racial bias, these factors indicate probable economic bias in
standardization, for poor children often come from families with absent or
unemployed fathers." 109 It therefore appears that these intelligence tests are
inappropriate for providing meaningful information about the learning abili-
ties of minority students, especially in relation to as important a decision as
placement in EMR classes.' "
0
In Larry P. v. Riles"'I the students subjected to EMR placement in San
Francisco schools sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the school
district from administering I.Q. tests to Black students for the purpose of
determining whether they should be placed in classes for the educable
mentally retarded. These students were placed in EMR classes because they
scored below seventy-five on the I.Q. tests. The children and their parents
asserted that they were not mentally retarded and that they were placed in
EMR classes on the basis of tests that were culturally biased against the
experience of Black children and, therefore, the administration of the tests
and classification pursuant thereto were in violation of their Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The plaintiffs further averred that they had received
irreparable injury from EMR placement because the curriculum was limited
educationally, teacher expectation was low, EMR students were ridiculed
by other students on the basis of this status, EMR students develop severe
feelings of inferiority, and EMR placement "is noted on a student's perma-
103. Id. at 1133.
104. Id.
105. Comment, Segregation of Poor and Minority Children into Classes for the Mentally
Retarded by the Use of LQ. Tests, 71 MicH. L. REV. 1212 (1973).
106. Id. at 1212.
107. Id. at 1215.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1216. It has been acknowledged that "[a] critical assumption is that the individu-
al tested is fairly comparable with the norming group in terms of environmental background and
psychological make-up; to the extent that the individual is not comparable, the test score may
reflect those differences rather than the student's capabilities." Id.
110. Id. at 1215.
111. 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974).
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nent school record, for colleges, prospective employers, and the armed
forces to see."
112
The court issued the preliminary injunction on the grounds that I.Q.
tests were the primary tool for placing students in EMR classes. Racial
imbalance clearly existed in the EMR classes, and the defendant school
district had not satisfied its burden of proving that I.Q. tests were rationally
related to the objective of separating students according to their learning
capabilities."f 3 The court elaborated:
In fact, plaintiffs have presented evidence in the form of
affidavits from certain black psychologists, that when they were
given the same I.Q. tests but with special attempts by the psycholo-
gists to establish rapport with the test-takers, to overcome plain-
tiffs' defeatism and easy distraction, to reword items in terms more
consistent with plaintiffs' cultural background, and to give credit
for non-standard answers which nevertheless showed an intelligent
approach to problems in the context of that background, plaintiffs
scored significantly above the cutting-off point of 75.114
A less sophisticated method of ability grouping was involved in Mc-
Neal v. Tate County School District. "5 The school system utilized a pupil
assignment plan at its elementary and junior high school levels. The plan
consisted of the teacher evaluating the pupil's performance and recom-
mending a program assignment for the next year to the principal, who then
made the final decision. As a result of this evaluation program, in every
elementary school there were from one to four all-Black sections and several
all-White sections in the higher grades. Consequently, a parent brought suit
to bar the maintenance of these segregated classrooms. The court, in
invalidating this plan, explained that school authorities were free to use
ability grouping only when its effect was not racially discriminatory.
116
Moreover, ability grouping was proscribed until the school district had
functioned as a unitary school system for an adequate period of time to
insure that the "under-achievement of the slower groups is not due to
yesterday's educational disparities.""11
7
112. Id. at 1308.
113. Id. at 1314. The statistics demonstrating racial imbalance disclosed that while Blacks
constituted 28.5% of the San Francisco Unified School District's student population, Blacks
represented 66% of the students in San Francisco's EMR program. Id. at 1311. State-wide,
Blacks comprised 9.1% of the student population; 27.5% of students in EMR classes, however,
were Black. Id. "Certainly these statistics indicate that there is a significant disproportion of
blacks in EMR classes in San Francisco and in California." Id.
114. Id. at 1308. The district court in Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967),
denounced the use of the track system for the same reasons enunciated in Larry P., concluding
that use of the system denied the students equal educational opportunity. Id. at 492.
115. 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975).
116. Id. at 1020.
117. Id. at 1021. See also Boyd v. Pointe Coupee Parish School, 505 F.2d 632 (5th Cir.
1974).
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4. Suspensions and Expulsions
The desegregation of public schools in the United States has also
resulted in a higher rate of suspensions among Black students in contrast to
their White contemporaries. In Little Rock, Arkansas, Blacks constitute
twenty-eight percent of the high school population and thirty-five percent of
the junior high school population, but nearly two-thirds of the students
suspended are Black. 18 These statistics are mirrored in New Orleans,
Louisiana; Columbus, Georgia; Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, Virginia;
St. Petersburg, Florida; Akron, Ohio, and other newly desegregated school
systems.1 9 Suspensions and expulsions are often utilized even though the
student misconduct is relatively trivial. Violations of institutional rules
regarding adherence to time schedules, deference to school authorities, and
silence at prescribed times frequently lead to banishment from the school.120
It has been suggested that not only is the "penalty often . . . excessively
punitive in light of the infraction,"' 121 but that exclusion from the school
"should be an extraordinary remedy employed only when other sanctions
are unavailing" 122 or when the security of individuals and property is
jeopardized. 1
23
In Hawkins v. Coleman 24 a student brought suit on behalf of himself
and other Black students in the Dallas school district. The plaintiff-student
contested suspensions on the grounds of racial discrimination and denial of
equal protection of the laws. Data accumulated by an expert in statistical
analysis was introduced at trial establishing that Blacks were in fact being
suspended from school in disproportional numbers to White students. 12 The
118. Yudhof, Suspension and Expulsion of Black Students From the Public Schools:
Academic Capital Punishment and the Constitution, 39 LAW & CON'TEMP. PROB. 374, 383
(1975).
119. Id. at 383-84.
120. Id. at 380.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 381.
123. Id. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), high school students who had been
suspended brought a class action suit against school authorities. The Court stated that a
student's right to an education is a property interest that may not be confiscated in the absence
of procedural safeguards as prescribed by the due process clause. Id. at 574. The Court also
noted that where a student has been suspended from school, his reputation and integrity are at
stake, and he thus has a liberty interest involved that is also protected by the due process
clause. Id. at 574-75. The Court announced the procedure that must be followed whenever a
suspension of ten days or less occurs: (1) the student must be given written or oral notice of the
charges, and if the charges are denied the school authorities must present the student with the
evidence upon which their proposed action is based, and give the student an opportunity to
explain his version of the incident; and (2) a notice and hearing should be provided before the
student is removed from school, except that when the student is a danger to property and
persons or to the order of the academic process, the student may be immediately removed from
school with the required notice and hearing following as soon as is feasible. Id. at 581-83.
124. 376 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
125. Id. at 1335.
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expert, after visiting six schools that were predominantly White, was able to
determine that within the Dallas s~hool system the unequal administration of
disciplinary procedures and policies was due to racial bias. 
126
An expert on institutional racism then examined the statistical data
collected and concluded that the Dallas school system exhibited the national
pattern of racial discrimination in operating as a White-controlled institution
with racial preferences reflected in the administration of its disciplinary
procedures. 127 The expert concluded that due to the existing racism Black
students would continue to become frustrated because the institution re-
mained unresponsive to their needs. As a result, the frustration would lead
to increased hostility, which in turn caused more suspendable conduct. 128
The court ordered the school board to reinstate the plaintiff and to
devise an affirmative program for improving relations with the school and
its community.129 The court emphasized that the program should include:
(1) schools holding their personnel accountable for reducing racism by
making promotions and pay increases dependent upon the teacher's abilities
effectively to control racist situations; (2) continuous training programs that
require administrators and teachers to attend special classes in human
relations designed to assist them in understanding their personal feelings
toward minority students, as well as provide a cultural awareness of Black
people; (3) helping Black students learn "to manage their way through the
racist institution"; and (4) schools actively cooperating with community
groups in developing an understanding of community problems. 130
B. Dispersion of the Largest Black Professional Group-Black Educators
The Black community has frequently seen its educators displaced once
desegregation plans have been implemented. 131 With the transition to a
unitary school system, sometimes accompanied by the closing of Black
neighborhood schools, many Black principals either have not been rehired
or have been demoted to positions requiring less responsibility. Some high
school principals have been relegated to principalships at junior high or
elementary schools, 132 where the Black principal has fewer students with
which to work, experiences a reduction in salary, and suffers diminished
status in the educational community. 133 Black teachers have found them-
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1336. The expert stated that "'institutional racism' exists . . . when the
standard operating procedures of an institution are prejudiced against, derogatory to, or
unresponsive to the needs of a particular racial group." Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1337-38.
130. Id.
131. Jefferson, School Desegregation and the Black Teacher: A Search for Effective Reme-
dies, 48 TUL. L. REv. 55 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Jefferson]. See also Note, Problems in
Faculty Desegregation, 43 Miss L.J. 363 (1972).
132. Jefferson, supra note 131, at 63-64.
133. Id. at 64.
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selves in similar circumstances, and have repeatedly been displaced by
White teachers. One Louisiana school district, during the 1969-70 school
year, failed to renew the contracts of twenty Black teachers; those positions
were filled primarily with Whites the following fall. 134 In another Louisiana
school district, nineteen Black teachers and three Black principals were not
rehired in 1970.135 There appeared to be no rational basis for these displace-
ments since both tenured and nontenured teachers were relieved, and many
Black teachers with substantial teaching experience were discharged "in
favor of whites not having demonstrably equal credentials."'
136
Black educators requested judicial intervention in these practices, and
in Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District137 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit promulgated guidelines for the hiring and firing
of faculty and staff whenever a school district is undergoing conversion
from a segregated to a unitary school system. The court outlined the
procedure to be followed: (1) principals, teachers, teacher aides, and other
staff are to be assigned so that the racial composition of a school staff in no
way indicates that the school is intended primarily for Black or White
students; 138 (2) staff members will be paid, hired, assigned, promoted,
demoted, and dismissed without consideration of race;13) (3) any reduction
in staff members via dismissal or demotion must be on the basis of objective
and nondiscriminatory standards applied to the entire district," and when
there is a dismissal or demotion no vacancy can be filled by the recruitment
of persons of a different race than that of the staff member dismissed or
demoted until that staff member has had an opportunity to "fill the vacancy
and has failed to accept an offer to do so"; 141 and (4) the school board must
develop objective, nondiscriminatory criteria for selecting any staff member
who might be dismissed or demoted, and these criteria must be retained by
the school district and made available for public inspection. 1
42
In 1974, two Black teachers sought injunctive relief in Thompson v.
Madison County Board of Education143 after the school board refused to
rehire them. The court found that both teachers had had numerous years of
teaching experience; that the school board had not determined that the
teachers were objectively unqualified for rehiring; that the teachers were
refused re-employment only two months after the order to desegregate; and
that the board made no attempt to adopt the Singleton procedures. In light of
134. Id. at 63.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970).





143. 496 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974). See also McLaurin v. Columbia Mun. Separate School
Dist., 478 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1973).
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those factors, the court rejected the school board's argument that the plain-
tiffs' teaching positions were lost for reasons other than the implementation
of the court-ordered integration."' 4 Furthermore, the court stated that
whenever faculty reduction is contemplated during the process of school
desegregation, Singleton is applicable. 4 5 Hence, the "plaintiffs were im-
properly refused rehiring and [were] entitled to reinstatement."
146
IV. New Directions in Keeping With Brown I
A. Freedom-of-Choice Revisited-Alternative Schools
The detrimental effects of desegregation that have been sustained by
the Black community have resulted in a search for other options that might
provide quality education within -a favorable learning environment. Those
options include a voluntary regional integrated school plan, local control of
neighborhood schools, and distinctive schools designed for those special
Black students who cannot benefit from the rigid, traditional approach to
learning found within the American educational system. These alternative
schools have and will continue to be met with tremendous opposition from
some Blacks and Whites who desire integration at all costs, as well as by
those who are wary of relinquishing the power that they have customarily
held over the educational structure. 
147
I. Voluntary Regional Integrated School Plan
Some people, concerned with integration and equal educational oppor-
tunity, assert that an integrated education is a right protected by the United
States Constitution. 148 It is argued that this right is found in three interests
safeguarded by the due process clause:
[A] fundamental interracial associational interest protected by the
first, thirteenth, and fourteenth amendments, a fundamental mobil-
ity interest in not being confined to a specific region of a city or
state, and the fundamental interest of a parent in shaping the
education of his child. These interests separately and together
create a right to an opportunity to an integrated education.'
49
The Voluntary Regional Integrated School Plan is designed to present a
partial remedy for de facto segregation and an alternative to neighborhood
144. Thompson v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 496 F.2d 682, 688 (5th Cir. 1974).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 689. But see Lee v. Chambers County Bd. of Educ., 533 F.2d 132 (5th Cir.
1976).
147. Hamilton, The Nationalist vs. the Integrationist, in SCHOOL Bus CONTROVERSY, supra
note 59 at 300-01; Kirp, Community Control, Public Policy, and the Limits of the Law, 68 MIcH.
L. REV. 1355, 1356-57 (1970).
148. Calkins & Gorwon, The Right to Choose an Integrated Education: Voluntary Regional
Integrated Schools-A Partial Remedy for De Facto Segregation, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
171 (1974).
149. Id. at 173.
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schools. 150 A Voluntary Regional Integrated School (VRIS) has the follow-
ing characteristics:
(1) It is situated in an urban area containing residential segregation
that produces racially identifiable schools.'
5 1
(2) The school is "regional" in that it does not incorporate any
specific vicinity of the urban area as its home or community, but, rather it
attracts students from any or all school districts within a broad locality.'
52
(3) The school is "integrated" because it "enrolls a proportion of
minority students not substantially less than the proportion of minority
children in the region as a whole."'
153
(4) Minority group children would attend the regional school free of
cost through financial arrangements with the school or school districts in
which the children would normally be enrolled.
154
Since the school is voluntary only children who want to attend will seek
admission; racial tension thus should be reduced.' 5 The plan requires a
substantial financial grant from the state or federal government and "a
sharing of local tax funds between the district operating the regional inte-
grated school and the school district in which the student may reside, if the
two districts are not the same."
156
2. Local Control of Neighborhood Schools
Many Black parents have watched in despair as their children either
drop out of school, or complete high school lacking the most rudimentary
communicative skills. Many believe that if they had control over the hiring
and dismissal of teachers and school administrators they could place dedi-
cated and effective teachers in the responsible positions of teaching their
children.157 Moreover, there is a growing unwillingness on the part of Black
parents to subject their children to daily abuse and hostility in desegregated
settings.158 Consequently, Black parents have experienced a sense of help-
150. Id. at 172.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 173.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 202.
156. Id. at 203.
157. Allen, The Politics of Urban Education, in BLACK MANIFESTO FOR EDUCATION 57, 64
(J. Haskins ed. 1973).
158. See Bell, Waiting On the Promise of Brown, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 341, 349
(1975). The events responsible for the increased frustration of Black parents have been well
illustrated: "The key to the disenchantment of black parents can be found in the desegregation
orders themselves. In an effort to make school desegregation as palatable for whites as
possible, courts have permitted school boards to close black schools, often over the vigorous
protests of the black communities they served, and authorized 'one-A ay' busing in which black
children do most or all of the bus riding while whites continue to attend schools in their
neighborhoods. Black teachers and administrators. . . have been decimated by the desegrega-
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lessness in not being able to affect the educational policy that shapes the
future of their children.
159
Evolving from this sense of despair is the desire for local control over
Black neighborhood schools. The foundation upon which that objective is
built involves a rejection of the theory that Black children must sit in
classrooms next to White children in order to be accorded equal citizenship
and furnished with a quality education.160 These parents have decided that
the racial composition of a school is insignificant for purposes of determin-
ing whether that school is inferior or superior, but "who controls that
school and in whose best interest it is controlled" are of great impor-
tance. 161 Black parents want their community to have control over utilization
of school resources, curriculum planning, and faculty accountability since
school boards for too long have been unresponsive to the needs of the Black
community. 1
62
One Black community in Alabama, having struggled with the local
board of education for a lengthy period of time and still finding it insensitive
to the Black community's needs, sought to establish itself as a state school
district under state law.163 The new school district would be governed by a
truly local school board elected by the residents of that particular communi-
ty. 164 The community school board then would solicit the expertise of
qualified community-oriented administrators and educators committed to
finding new solutions to the traditional educational problems that have
plagued the Black community's children. 165 Additionally, strong parent
associations and the placement of persons from the community into the
positions of teacher aides were encouraged, thereby providing every child
with individual attention and freeing the teacher to instruct. 166
3. Special Black Schools
Another form of the alternative school is the special school for Black
youths who have complained that the traditional school system is too
structured and the customary curriculum is too boring and meaningless.
tion process despite herculean efforts by civil rights attorneys to protect their jobs. Even the
percentages of black students assigned to white schools are determined less by the percentage
of black students in the school district than by the number of blacks white parents will tolerate
before withdrawing their children." Id. at 369 (footnotes omitted).
159. CORE, A Proposal for Community School Districts, in SCHOOL BUS CONTROVERSY,
supra note 59, at 313. See also Dimond, Reform of the Government of Education: A Resolution
of the Conflict Between "Integration" and "Community Control," 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1005
(1970).
160. CORE, A Proposal for Community School Districts, in SCHOOL Bus CONTROVERSY,
supra note 59, at 312.
161. Id. (emphasis in original).
162. Id. at 312-13.
163. Id. at 318.
164. Id. at 319.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 320.
Summer 1977] EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Attempts have been made to develop a course of study that moves beyond
cultivation of the cognitive skills, and embraces every aspect of the Black
youth's experience including his language, cultural life style, history, and
social and psychological goals. 167 This course of study emphasizes the
possibility that "a characteristic which is rejected by one social class, one
ethnoreligious group, or one race may be a value response in another to a
different physical, economic, and or cultural reality and may be quite
realistic and respectable."' 68 This type of curriculum offers the Black youth
an opportunity thoroughly to explore her environment while also developing
her abilities in reading, writing, and mathematics.
One experimental program encompassing twenty-three alternative
schools was initiated in California by the Berkeley Unified School Dis-
trict. 169 Two of the alternative schools, Black House and Casa de la Raza,
were solely for Black and Chicano students. These schools were dismantled
four years ago after the civil rights division of HEW announced that they
were unconstitutional due to their racial selectivity. 170 Black House and
Casa de la Raza endeavored to provide learning programs that were "free
from the white, middle-class biases and pressures allegedly characteristic of
an ordinary public school environment." 171 Due to the deficiencies of Black
students in rudimentary educational skills, Black House accentuated such
skills as reading and writing, but the faculty attempted to teach these
subjects through the use of ethnically oriented materials in contrast to the
more traditional approaches to learning. 172 Moreover, the school attempted
critically to evaluate the role of democratic institutions in the United States:
Traditional schooling, [asserted the Director], usually fails to
reveal the interaction between politics and power or lack of power
within these institutions. As a result, the traditional way of learning
about such institutions is neither particularly relevant nor educa-
tionally beneficial for many black students.17
3
The entire faculty was Black because the director believed that Black
teachers are particularly cognizant of the emotional and educational needs of
Black students and, therefore, are able to establish a rapport with their
pupils that other teachers cannot. 174
167. Sizemore, Education for Liberation, 81 SCHOOL REV. 389 (1973).
168. Id. at 398.
169. Comment, Alternative Schools for Minority Students: The Constitution, the Civil
Rights Act, and the Berkeley Experiment, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 858 (1973).
170. Interview with Dr. Ball, Assistant Superintendent of the Berkeley School System
(Mar. 10, 1977).
171. Comment, Alternative Schools for Minority Students: The Constitution, the Civil
Rights Act, and the Berkeley Experiment, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 858 (1973).
172. Id. at 860.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 860-61. Unique features of Casa de ]a Raza are its governing body, which
consists of parents, students, and staff members, and the significant role of community-related
projects in the school's educational program. Id. at 863-64.
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Although these alternative schools were organized for a legitimate
objective-to teach the students how to read and write and to teach them
about themselves and the socio-political environment in which they live-
the schools' use of racial criteria in admitting students and selecting faculty
made both schools targets for attack under the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 175 It is unfortunate that the Brown I decision,
promulgated to protect the rights of third-world children, may eventually
prevent this kind of restructuring within the educational system which, if
allowed, would have the effect of promoting, the same minority rights
Brown I sought to protect.
176
Judge John M. Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals displayed
a comprehension of the despair experienced by Black people, which is
created by low socioeconomic status, poor housing, and inferior schools
when he stated:
I can understand, therefore, the disillusionment black nationalists
have with the progress and effectiveness of school desegregation. I
can understand how separation of the races, if it means local
control by blacks for blacks, may generate not the feeling of
inferiority which the Supreme Court found in Brown, but a feeling
of pride and respect-if the quality of education can be raised and
economic opportunity increased.1
77
Thus, it is possible that the interests asserted in Brown I still may be
advanced through innovative and nontraditional channels if the judiciary's
growing empathy with the special problems experienced by Blacks in
education continues.
Recently, however, the California Supreme Court in Bakke v. Regents
of the University of California178 invalidated a special admissions program
for students of minority races due to the university's use of race as a
criterion for admission to its medical school at Davis. In 1973 and 1974,
Bakke applied for admission to the medical school at Davis. Of the 100
places available each year for new admittees, 16 were reserved for minority
students entering under the special admissions program. 179 This program
175. Id. at 865. It is recognized that now "[r]acial classifications are advocated by groups
who historically decried their use; educational differences are promoted by those who once
demanded sameness of treatment; and restrictions on free association-once considered inim-
ical to the notion of equality-are now advanced in the name of ethnic identity, community
control, and alternative schooling." Id. at 869.
176. Kirp, Community Control, Public Policy, and the Limits of Law, 68 MICH. L. REv.
1356, 1374-88 (1970).
177. Wisdom, Random Remarks on the Role of Social Sciences in the Judicial Decision-
Making Process in School Desegregation Cases, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 134, 148 (1975).
178. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976).
179 . Although the program was designated for economically or educationally disadvan-
taged applicants seeking admission to the medical school, and even though Whites had applied
to the program in 1973 and 1974, "only minority students had been admitted under the program
since its inception [in 1969], and members of the white race were barred from participation."
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employed less rigid standards for evaluating the proficiencies of minority
applicants than those used to appraise Whites applying through the regular
admission procedure. Bakke was denied admission in both years. He subse-
quently brought suit against the university to compel his admission, alleging
that he was qualified to attend the medical school, that preferential standards
for admitting members of minority groups resulted in less qualified minority
applicants being admitted over more qualified nonminority applicants, and
that, as a consequence, he was the victim of invidious discrimination based
upon his race in contravention of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
The California Supreme Court noted that classification according to
race is not inherently unconstitutional and that such a classification has been
upheld within a number of contexts for the purpose of providing a benefit to
racial minority groups. 180 The court explained, however, that those in-
stances in which the classification has been allowed were distinguishable from
"the special admissions program in at least one critical respect. . . . "[in
that] [iln none of them did the extension of a right or benefit to a minority
have the effect of depriving persons who were not members of a minority
group of benefits which they would otherwise have enjoyed.' ' 181 Sustaining
Bakke's allegations, the court concluded that as a result of the regular
admissions program that summarily denied entrance to Whites with a grade
point average below 2.5, while the special admissions program accepted
members of various racial minorities with grade point averages considerably
below 2.5, there were applicants who had been denied admission solely
because they were not members of racial minority groups. Thus these
applicants were deprived of a benefit they otherwise would have received.1
82
The program was held to violate the equal protection clause.
Justice Tobriner, dissenting, stated that the difference between the
racial classifications utilized by the special admissions program and the
invidious racial classifications nullified in prior cases is that the former does
not prevent any racial group from participating in the university's medical
school process: "The great majority of students admitted by the medical
school were, of course, White; the racial classifications were thus clearly
not used to exclude any race but rather to assure that no race was ex-
cluded." ' 183 Furthermore, Justice Tobriner sought to refute the majority's
180. Instances cited by the court in which the classification had been deemed permissible
were: (1) to achieve public school integration (Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); San
Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 479 P.2d 669, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309
( 971)); (2) to compel a school district to provide instruction in the English language to pupils of
Chinese descent (Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)); (3) to sustain the voting rights of non-
English speaking persons (Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Castro v. State of
California, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970)). Bakke v. Regents of the Univ.
of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 46, 553 P.2d 1152, 1160, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 688 (1976).
181. 18 Cal. 3d at 46, 553 P.2d at 1160, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
182. Id. at 48, 553 P.2d at 1161-62, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 689-90.
183. Id. at 68 n.1, 553 P.2d at 1175 n.l, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 703 n.l.
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proposition that prior cases upholding preferential treatment to racial minor-
ity groups did not involve denial of a benefit or right to nonminorities. The
justice explained that pursuant to Title VII, 84 employers have been required
to hire a certain percentage of members of racial minority groups. As a
consequence, some Whites, otherwise entitled to employment, may not be
hired because the employer is compelled to hire minority group members.
The practice of using racial criteria for the purpose of bestowing a
benefit upon minority groups while concomitantly denying that benefit to
the majority group is under severe assault. 185 The impetus for that assault
has been the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
provides that each state shall accord every person within its jurisdiction
equality of treatment before the laws of that state and of the United States. 1
86
Whenever a class of people are denied the rights and privileges enjoyed by
others similarly situated, the mode and purpose of that denial become
suspect. 187 Courts will strictly scrutinize the governmental objective sought
by the classifications based upon race; such classifications are inherently
suspect.'88 For the suspect classification to withstand such scrutiny, the
objective advanced by the government or one of its agencies must represent
a compelling state interest. 189 Bakke holds that even though the university's
interest in diversifying its student body, integrating the medical profession,
and providing minority doctors for minority group communities may be a
compelling governmental interest, the university did not demonstrate its
184. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I to -15. The employment cases that Justice Tobriner cited as
supporting authority were: United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Workers Int'l, 471 F.2d 408
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,443 F.2d 544
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 18 Cal.
3d at 71 n.5, 533 P.2d at 1177 n.5, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 705 n.5.
185. See, e.g., Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152,
132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976).
186. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
187. "Differences in race may not be made the basis of the way in which persons are
treated by the law; the right to equal treatment may not depend upon a characteristic such as
race or color." B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 313 (1972).
188. "Normally, the widest discretion is allowed [a] legislative judgment . . . and normally
that judgment is given the benefit of every conceivable circumstance which might suffice to
characterize the classification as reasonable rather than arbitrary and invidious. . . . But we
deal here with a classification based upon the race of the participants, which must be viewed in
light of the historical fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States. This strong policy
renders racial classifications 'constitutionally suspect,' Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499;
and subject to the 'most rigid scrutiny,' Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 ....
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (Florida statue prohibiting only interracial
unmarried couples from habitually living in and occupying the same room in the nighttime)
(citation omitted).
189. See, e.g., De Funis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated and
remanded as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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inability to achieve those objectives by means less likely to abridge the
rights of Whites.
190
It therefore appears, at least insofar as educational institutions are con-
cerned, that the use of racial criteria for determining whom is to be admitted
and whom excluded may no longer be acceptable as a means necessary to
accomplish any compelling governmental interest. 191 It is also apparent that
alternative schools using racial exclbsivity as a foundation for their exist-
ence may find it increasingly difficult to convince a court that all-Black or
all-Chicano schools are necessary in order successfully to teach their stu-
dents how to read, write, and examine their sociopolitical environments.
There is no evidence that the enrollment of White students in this kind of
alternative school would be fatal to the educational experiences specifically
designed for minority group members. If the special admissions program in
Bakke had accepted at least one disadvantaged White applicant per year, it
might have been held constitutionally valid. Sacrificing complete racial
exclusivity is a lesser burden than forfeiture of an entire program or school
devised specifically for the benefit of racial minorities.
B. School Finance Plans Revamped
The effort to provide quality education to all children in the United
States has also focused on the manner in which public school systems are
financed. Examination has revealed that a disparity in the number of dollars
expended per child per school district results in unequal institutional re-
sources and varying degrees of educational quality. California's method of
school financing was invalidated by the state supreme court in Serrano v.
Priest (Serrano //).192 Parents of children enrolled in elementary and second-
ary schools brought a class action suit alleging that the public school system
relied heavily on local property taxes and thereby created inequality among
individual school districts in that the amount available to be spent per
student in districts with smaller tax bases was less than that available to be
spent per child in districts with higher assessed property valuations.
The court stated that:
[t]he wealth of a school district, as measured by its assessed valua-
tion, is the major determinant of educational expenditures. Al-
though the amount of money raised locally is also a function of the
rate at which residents of a district are willing to tax themselves, as
a practical matter districts with small tax bases simply cannot levy
taxes at a rate sufficient to produce the revenue that more affluent
districts reap with minimal tax efforts.
193
190. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 18 Cal. 3d at 52-53, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 693.
191. But see United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 97 S. Ct. 196 (1977), in which the
United States Supreme Court upheld the use of racial criteria for the purpose of restructuring
legislative districts in New York, when past racial discrimination wa; noted by the New York
legislature.
192. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
193. Id. at 598, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610. For an in-depth analysis of state
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In finding the state's method of school financing unconstitutional, the court
noted that the plaintiffs had made numerous contentions that the financing
plan failed to meet the equal protection requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the equal protection
provisions of the California Constitution in that: (1) the financing scheme
made the quality of education for school children in California a direct
corollary of the wealth of the children's parents and neighborhoods; t94 (2)
the financing scheme made the quality of education dependent upon "the
geographical accident of the school district in which said children re-
side";l95 (3) the financing scheme did not take into consideration any of the
differing educational needs of the various school districts and the children
residing in those districts; 196 (4) the financing scheme did not provide
children of equal age, motivation, and aptitude with equal educational
resources; 197 (5) the financing scheme perpetuated distinct differences in the
quality of educational services, facilities, and equipment within the educa-
tional system; 198 (6) "the use of the 'school district' as a unit for the
differential allocation of educational funds [bore] no reasonable relation to
the California legislative purpose of providing equal educational opportunity
for all school children within the State"; 199 and (7) there was a dispropor-
tionate number of minority group children residing in school districts which
were providing inferior educational opportunity.
2°°
The Serrano opinion seems to have started a trend in the United States
toward questioning the legitimacy of public school financing plans. 20 1 The
1973 decision of the United States Supreme Court in San Antonio Indepen-
dent School District v. Rodriguez,202 however, threatened to halt the pro-
gressive aims of many states when the Court held that the Texas method of
disbursing monies to its school districts was not unconstitutional. 2 3 Surpris-
ingly, however, individual states have continued to reform their methods of
financing schemes, see generally CooNs, CLUNE, & SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC
EDUCATION (1970). See also WISE, RICH SCHOOLS POOR SCHOOLS (1973).






200. Id. Serrano reached the court a second time in Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557
P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3822 (U.S. June 15, 1977).
201. See, e.g., Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Sweetwater
County Planning Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wo. 1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J.
Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
202. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
203. Id. at 55. The United States Supreme Court asserted that the appellee-parents had not
established that a definable class of poor persons were being discriminated against via the
State's method of public school financing (id. at 22-23); that education was not a fundamental
right protected by the Constitution (id. at 35); and that the state's public school system assured
a basic education for all Texas children (id. at 49).
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financing public instruction, undeterred by Rodriguez." The thrust for-
ward toward equal educational opportunity has not subsided.
Conclusion
This note presents a review of the experiences of Blacks in their
struggle for equal educational opportunity. The Brown 1205 decision in 1954
was a sincere response to the ills produced by forced separation of the races
within the public school system and was, at that time, an appropriate
response. This is not to suggest that segregation in public schools as it was
known during the era of Brown I should be reinstated. It must be under-
stood, however, that flexibility in pursuing alternatives to complete desegre-
gation is necessary if the goals of providing quality education and therefore
providing a better future for all children in the United States are to be
realized. The various forms of alternative schools promise to make those
goals attainable in contradistinction to the ineffectuality of many desegrega-
tion efforts. To embrace these alternatives with renewed hope is logical and
pragmatic, for we cannot resign ourselves to the unyielding concept that
desegregation of the public schools is the only method of supplying quality
education. Integration "at all costs" is not a laudable position to assume
when the discovery of viable modes for promoting the educational progress
of our children should be our primary concern.
The freedom-of-choice plan in Green v. Count'y School Board,
206
which allowed students to attend the schools of their choice, was in confor-
mity with the requests made by the school children plaintiffs in Brown I.
The children merely sought admittance to schools not located in Black
communities. Nullification of legally sanctioned segregated schools was the
sine qua non that would permit realization of free choice in school attend-
ance. The desegregation decrees that followed were an exaggerated re-
sponse to the relief initially requested in Brown L The desegregation fervor,
manifest in the preoccupation of the courts with racial percentages in
primary and secondary schools, restructuring of school districts, and busing
of school children, has not reaped the substantial benefits for Black people
that were once anticipated. Moreover, since the 1954 decision of Brown I
there have been vast changes in the sociopolitical ideologies of the Black
community. Those changes have resulted in the evolution of new avenues
through which the struggle for equal educational opportunity should be
directed. The alternative schools discussed earlier exemplify those new
avenues.
Attendance at neighborhood schools should no longer be predicated
upon the racial composition of those schools. Every community has a
204. See Berke, Recent Adventures of State School Finance: A Saga of Rocket Ships and
Glider Planes, 82 SCHOOL REV. 183 (1974).
205. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
206. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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legitimate interest in preserving the effective utilization of its institutional
units. To compel children of one neighborhood to attend schools in a foreign
neighborhood is an unnatural phenomenon, and parents should continue
vigorously to protest against this policy, advancing instead voluntary attend-
ance at the school of one's choice. Directly related to the issue of race and
neighborhood schools, and a much more logical target for school deseg-
regationists, are discriminatory housing practices that result in one-race
schools. The eradication of those practices will provide minorities unencum-
bered access to White residential districts and initiate the erosion of racial
imbalance in public schools, thus eliminating not only existing segregated
housing, but also one-race conditions at many schools. To demonstrate
concern for segregated schools without an accompanying interest in seg-
regated residential areas signifies a half-hearted and incomplete attempt to
solve a broader problem.
Black parents should continue to focus upon the quality of the educa-
tion their children receive. Their attention should be directed, however,
toward upgrading the schools in their communities through participating in
decisions that design and implement learning programs for their children,
and developing effective methods that will insure a more responsive attitude
from school authorities to the needs of children in those communities.
Moreover, the allocation of additional resources, pursuant to reforms in
school financing plans, will assist Black communities in improving the
education their schools provide. These rechanneled efforts are sure to result
in schools of which Black communities can be proud.
Unfortunately, with the advent of the special Black schools that pre-
clude White participation, competing constitutional interests arise: the right
to liberty and self-determination by one group versus the right of the other
group not to be excluded from a governmental enterprise on the basis of
race. These competing interests present a false issue in that any time a
minority group is accorded special consideration in an attempt to overcome
the discriminatory practices that have permeated American society for two
hundred years, some members of the White group will be marginally and
temporarily displaced. This displacement has been sanctioned by the United
States Supreme Court in numerous instances.
20 7
It is ironic to find minority admissions programs at universities and
colleges being challenged when the scholastic achievement levels of Black
students in primary and secondary schools remain inadequate for successful
competition with their White counterparts. Yet educational programs de-
vised by schools to improve the academic performance of Blacks where
desegregation efforts have failed are also challenged as withholding yet
another benefit from Whites. The methods employed to impede the struggle
of Blacks for equal educational opportunity are endless.
207. Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); United States v. Montgomery Bd. of
Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
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